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The Eleventh of September this year marks 300 years 
since Barcelona fell into the hands of Philip V’s Bourbon 
troops. This is a landmark event which, as is common 
knowledge, marked a turning point in our country’s his-
tory. The institutions, freedoms, rights and also duties of 
the Catalans of that period languished between the day 
after the defeat and the issuance of the Nueva Planta De-
cree on the 16th of January 1716. The Catalan institution-
al edifice shaped over more than six centuries fell just like 
a house of cards under the hurricane-force winds, never 
to return, even though memory and especially the vast 
amounts of documentation about that period preserved 
in both the archives of the Principality and elsewhere 
have kept them alive for both scholars and in memory.
The Eleventh of September 1714 was also one of the 
many episodes that should be included within the general 
framework of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-
1713/1715), an international dynastic conflict that pitted 
the European powers of the day against each other in the 
dispute between the Hapsburg and Bourbon crowns. The 
first great war of the 18th century stands out for its multi-
ple fronts, high number of victims – almost 1,250,000 – 
and enormous financial outlay that both sides had to 
make owing to the fascinating propagandistic battles with 
which they strove to conquer public opinion, as well as 
the national dimension it took on in Spain, with the strug-
gle between two different conceptions that sought to im-
pose their models of state: the absolutism rooted at the 
Castilian court versus Catalan constitutionalism.
To commemorate the Tricentennial, this year the His-
tory-Archaeology Section of the Institut d’Estudis Cata-
lans organised an international congress entitled “Cata-
lunya (i els Països Catalans) abans i després de l’Onze de 
Setembre de 1714” (Catalonia [and the Catalan-Speak-
ing Lands] Before and After the Eleventh of September 
1714) which was held from the 24th to 27th of February 
2014. The purpose of the congress, in the words of its 
scientific coordinator, Antoni Simon i Tarrés, a member 
of the IEC’s History-Archaeology Section, was to take 
stock of the historiographic output on events that left 
such a profound mark on Catalonia’s historical forma-
tion. The two lectures and ten reports that made up the 
bulk of the congress were divided into two basic strands: 
first, the territorial scope of the conflict that stretched 
beyond the boundaries of the Principality to include 
other zones within the Catalan-speaking lands in the 
story, with the presence of researchers from there, and 
secondly the analysis of the war and repression from a 
multidisciplinary standpoint. These latter reports exam-
ined topics like the military impact, social and political 
changes and repercussions that the conflict had on the 
language and culture, the role of the institutions and the 
effects on law.
The opening day was attended by the president of the 
Institut d’Estudis Catalans, Mr Joandomènec Ros, who 
welcomed the participants along with Antoni Simon.
After establishing the scholarly criteria of the congress 
and reviewing its objectives and avenues of inquiry, the 
keynote lecture was delivered by Patrici Pojada, a profes-
sor of Modern History at the Université de Perpignan. It 
was entitled “Unes Catalunyes sense Noves Plantes? La 
Guerra de Successió d’Espanya i les seves conseqüències 
vistes des dels nords” (Catalonias without Nuevas Plan-
tas? The War of the Spanish Succession and its Conse-
quences as Seen from the North). In this lecture, he exam-
ined the specific cases of Roussillon and the Vall d’Aran 
in the course of the War of the Spanish Succession and 
especially the situation after the conflict. In Pojada’s opin-
ion, the real reason for studying Roussillon and the Vall 
d’Aran was that neither was subjected to the Nueva Planta 
Decree for different reasons. During the conflict, the Vall 
d’Aran shifted from Bourbon to Hapsburg hands in 1706 
and then back again in 1711. The influence in this region 
of the Barons of Les – who served as the governor of the 
region – and its clear leaning towards the Bourbons from 
the very start meant that once the conflict was over, un-
like the rest of Catalonia, the Nueva Planta Decree was 
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not applied in Vall d’Aran, nor was the system of corregi-
ments (townships). It was not applied de iure, but, as Po-
jada recalled, it was indeed applied de facto after 1726, 
when the Baron of Les came to preside over the General 
Council of Aran as if it were a corregiment by another 
name.
The situation in Roussillon was different to that in the 
Principality and the Vall d’Aran as the consequence of the 
Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659). Despite the fact that Louis 
XIV had pledged to respect features like the municipal 
system of the countships and Catalan law, the fact is that 
after the second half of the 17th century, Roussillon un-
derwent various reforms, such as the introduction of the 
French language at the Université de Perpignan, changes 
the number of places in the administration of justice and 
the introduction of job-buying in municipal posts. In 
Patrici Pojada’s opinion, while the north did not have to 
suffer from the Nueva Planta, it was gradually denatured 
on an institutional level, while its ties to the south were 
gradually severed. This can be seen, for example, in the 
changes in Roussillon’s trade during the 18th century, 
when it ceased to be oriented towards the Principality and 
became geared towards France instead.
The second day started with a report by Antoni Simon, 
a professor of Modern History at the Universitat Autòno-
ma de Barcelona and member of the History-Archaeolo-
gy Section of the Institut d’Estudis Catalans. Entitled 
“Abans i després del 1705. L’autogovern de Catalunya 
com a objectiu polític de la classe dirigent catalana” (Be-
fore and After 1705. Self-Governance in Catalonia as a 
Political Goal of the Catalan Ruling Class), his purpose 
was to reaffirm the claims made in his recent publication 
(Antoni Simon. Del 1640 al 1705. L’autogovern de Catalu-
nya i la classe dirigent catalana en el joc de la política inter-
nacional europea. PUV, Valencia 2011) by bringing in 
new documentary evidence that confirms his hypotheses. 
His primary claim is that the main reason the Catalan rul-
ing class sided with the Hapsburgs during the War of the 
Spanish Succession was to recover the self-governance 
that had been lost after 1652 and that under no circum-
stances did the Catalans wish to intervene in the general 
affairs of the Spanish monarchy in 1705, as other authors 
have claimed.
Carme Pérez Aparicio turned her attention to war and 
repression in Valencia during the War of the Spanish 
Succession in her report entitled “Després d’Almansa. 
Guerra i repressió al País Valencià” (After Almansa. War 
and Repression in Valencia). Beyond surveying the insti-
tutional repression decreed by Philip V with the suppres-
sion of the Valencian furs (code of law) on the 29th of 
June 1707, this historian focused on the coercion stem-
ming from the war to recover the strongholds which were 
still loyal to the Hapsburgs after the Bourbon victory in 
Almansa, as well as the coercion used to establish domi-
nation over the territory over which the Bourbons had 
wrested control. In this sense, Carme Pérez Aparicio re-
counted several kinds of repression: confiscations of the 
goods owned by Hapsburg supporters, the burning of Xà-
tiva for instructing the rebel strongholds that did not 
peacefully submit to Bourbon weapons, deportations of 
the people from pro-Hapsburg centres to places with 
proven loyalty to the Bourbons, and threats to the people 
of Valencia with the instalment of a force to prevent any 
potential pro-Hapsburg conspirators. The Bourbon re-
gime did manage to control the country, but it paid a very 
high price: the actions to establish this control generated a 
broad state of opinion against the monarchy in Valencia, 
and not only among those who had supported the Haps-
burgs; many pro-Bourbon amanuenses wrote to the 
king to ask him for mercy on a people who had suffered 
greatly.
Under the title of “El paper de les Illes Balears en l’etapa 
final de la Guerra de Successió” (The Role of the Balearic 
Islands in the Final Stage of the War of the Spanish Suc-
cession), Miquel Àngel Casasnovas, a PhD in History and 
member of the Institut Menorquí d’Estudis, analysed the 
development of the War of the Spanish Succession on the 
islands, stressing the complexity stemming from the mul-
tiplicity of powers present and the lack of territorial unity 
in politics: the only tie that bound them together was the 
figure of the monarch. Therefore, each island played a 
unique role in the course of the war. For example, while 
Mallorca served as a provisioning base for besieged Bar-
celona, Menorca played a more strategic military role. 
Obviously, the other islands played a more minor role be-
cause of their smaller size. The islands’ eventual choice of 
the Hapsburg side can primarily be explained by the pres-
ence of the English-Dutch navy in the Mediterranean. In 
the case of Menorca, the speaker stressed the importance 
of the British, who had grasped the strategic importance 
of this island since the 1660s. In fact, once the island had 
gone over to the allied side, the only concern of the British 
seemed to be ensuring the direct control that the 1713 
Treaty of Utrecht had given them. As a result, the Menor-
cans managed to save themselves from the Nueva Planta 
decree, even though the British tolerated only those insti-
tutions that did not challenge the power of their domina-
tion. In contrast, Mallorca returned to Bourbon hands in 
1714 and its former privileges were eliminated by the 
Bourbons’ Nueva Planta Decree.
In his report entitled “Més enllà de la Guerra de Suc-
cessió. La Sardenya catalana sota el domini dels Savoia” 
(Beyond the War of the Spanish Succession. Catalan Sar-
dinia under the Domination of the Savoy), Lluís-J. Guia 
Marín, a full professor of Modern History at the Universi-
tat de València and a research affiliate at the Istituto di 
Storia dell’Europa Mediterranea of the Consiglio Nazion-
ale delle Ricerche, examined the political-institutional 
continuities with Catalan roots on the island of Sardinia 
throughout the entire 18th century, even though it had 
been separated from the territories of the Crown of 
Aragón. In the late 17th century, the island of Sardinia 
was fully integrated into the realm of the former Crown of 
Aragón in terms of both its institutions and its culture. 
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Unlike other geographic regions, the War of the Spanish 
Succession was not a traumatic event for the island. Al-
though it switched sides several times, its internal institu-
tions remained intact even after the arrival of the Savoy 
dynasty on the island after 1720. Institutions like the Sar-
dinian Audience and the Sardinian Courts, which wrote 
their laws in Catalan, demonstrated Catalonia’s enduring 
influence on the island. Linguistically, too, the survival of 
Catalan, even though it gradually lost ground first to 
Spanish and later to Italian, shows us the importance of 
Sardinia’s ties with the lands of the Crown of Aragón until 
well into the 18th century.
The first report on Wednesday the 26th of February 
entitled “Guerra i quotidianitat militar en temps de setge: 
Barcelona i Catalunya el 1713-1714” (War and Everyday 
Life in the Military in Times of Siege: Barcelona and Cata-
lonia in 1713-1714) was delivered by Adrià Cases. This 
report sought to explore the dynamics during the last year 
of the war in the Principality in an effort to shed light on 
the interconnections between the two poles of resistance: 
namely, Barcelona and Cardona. During this period, the 
Catalans were trailing behind the events happening on 
the larger international scene. In Madrid, it was believed 
that the war was about to end in early 1713, which was the 
reason for the Junta General de Braços’s sudden decision 
to resist to the death in July 1713. From then on, the court 
of Madrid was totally determined to win back Barcelona 
at any cost, and to this end it started the siege of the capi-
tal of Catalonia, first taking the plain in order to block the 
front, and later, after July 1714, mounting a traditional 
siege in which they managed to blockade the city entirely, 
leading its defenders to suffer from hunger and despera-
tion. Regarding the inland regions of the country, after 
the loss of the Castellciutat fortress in late 1713, the war 
had been centred on Cardona, as the only stronghold of 
resistance left. The main goal of the Hapsburg army in the 
inland regions, commanded by the Marquis of Poal, was 
to try to break the cordon that the Bourbons had estab-
lished around Barcelona, although they never managed to 
do so. After the fall of Barcelona, the castle of Cardona 
had to be handed over and the official status of the Haps-
burg army was removed, even though the majority of its 
leaders had gone into exile to avoid retaliation.
After that, in the report entitled “El model polític català 
de 1702-1706 i la seva liquidació borbònica” (The Catalan 
Political Model from 1702-1706 and its Bourbon Liquida-
tion), Eva Serra, an emeritus professor at the Universitat 
de Barcelona and member of the Institut d’Estudis Cata-
lans, surveyed the Catalan constitutionalist system prior 
to the imposition of the Nueva Planta decree in January 
Figure 1. Opening event of the international congress “Catalonia (and the Catalan-speaking Lands) before and after the Eleventh of Septem-
ber 1714”. Left to right: Patrici Pojada, professor of Modern History at the Université de Perpignan; Joandomenec Ros, president of the Insti-
tut d’Estudis Catalans; and Antoni Simon, scientific coordinator of the congress.
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1716 and how the Nueva Planta, with absolutist roots, 
came with a new fiscal model that totally eliminated the 
dynamics that had developed in the Crown of Aragón un-
til the early 18th century. Catalan pactism, which was 
grounded in institutions that were quite representative 
for that period, continued developing in the Courts of 
1701-1702 and 1705-1706 despite the legislative halt en-
tailed by the time elapsed since the convocation closed in 
1599. The legislative reforms aimed to reinforce all the 
key elements sought by the participants in the Courts ex-
cept the return of control over ballot voting, which nei-
ther Philip V first nor Archduke Charles later agreed to 
grant in the meetings with the Braços. Eva Serra believes 
that all of this modern legislative output should be con-
trasted with the institution of laws stemming from the 
Nueva Planta, which were clearly archaic in nature.
After Eva Serra’s talk, researchers Josep Catà and An-
toni Muñoz took the stage with the talk entitled “La re-
pressió després del 1714: execucions, empresonaments i 
exilis interns” (The Repression After 1714: Executions, 
Imprisonments and Internal Exiles”). First, Josep Catà set 
forth the main objectives of Bourbon repression and the 
instruments used to achieve these objectives. Catà showed 
that this repression was largely planned before the Cata-
lan defeat, especially in broad strokes, and that it aimed to 
ensure Philip V’s control over the Principality. In terms of 
the specific instruments of repression, Josep Catà men-
tioned the annulment of Catalan public law, the confisca-
tion of public property, the increase in fiscal pressure on 
the country, the permanent presence of an occupying 
army made up of more than 30,000 troops and repression 
over the resistant elites. In turn, Antoni Muñoz focused 
his report on the repression experienced by the military 
and political elite of the pro-Hapsburg resistance in Cata-
lonia, exercised in the guise of imprisonment and exile. 
Despite the wording of Barcelona’s capitulation, leaders 
of the resistance like Antoni de Villarroel, Josep de Roca-
bertí and Guerau de Peguera suffered from the conse-
quences.
In his talk entitled “Acomodació i resistència a les polí-
tiques de minoració de la llengua catalana (1716-1888)” 
(Accommodation and Resistance to Minority Policies of 
the Catalan Language [1716-1888]), Albert Rossich, a 
professor of Catalan Philology at the Universitat de Giro-
na, analysed the policies used after the defeat on the Elev-
enth of September 1714 to gradually replace the Catalan 
language with Spanish, the Catalans’ attitudes towards 
this effort and the reasons behind these attitudes. When 
the Nueva Planta Decree entered into force, a period be-
gan, the first half of the 18th century, which was domi-
nated by the different rules that affected the Catalan lan-
guage in official spheres. The culmination of this process 
came with the Royal Warrant issued on the 23rd of June 
1768. All of these rules, however, were not viewed by soci-
ety as attempts to destroy the Catalan people, who were 
primarily illiterate and monolingual and more likely to 
identify with the old public legal system abolished in 
1714. With the advent of the Enlightenment, however, 
Rossich notes that there was a paradigm shift, at least 
among some of Catalan society: the most prominent Cat-
alan proponents of the Enlightenment, like Antoni de 
Capmany and Antoni Puigblanch, chose to abjure an “ar-
chaic” Catalan language and were instead in favour of re-
placing it with “modern” Spanish. The marginalisation of 
Catalan spread until well into the second half of the 19th 
century, when the Renaixença managed to revive it.
The last day of the congress started with the report en-
titled “L’altra cara de la Guerra de Successió a Catalunya: 
la violència contra la població civil” (The Other Face of 
the War of the Spanish Succession in Catalonia: Violence 
against Civilians) delivered by Josep Maria Torras i Ribé, 
an emeritus professor of Modern History at the Universi-
tat de Barcelona. With the failure of the allied offensives 
against Madrid in 1707 and 1710, Catalonia became the 
main theatre in the conflict. From then on, there seemed 
to be a trend every time the Bourbons surrendered a site: 
freedom in exchange for capitulation, withdrawal of the 
Hapsburg troops with military honours and, once they 
were gone, the unleashing of repression against the civil-
ians. After Lleida and Tortosa fell into Bourbon hands 
and the Terres de Ponent front was stabilised, the Bour-
bon army undertook a kind of psychological warfare 
aimed at demoralising the inhabitants of the region. 
Many chroniclers concur in stating that the Bourbon of-
ficers had issued their troops orders to attack civilians in a 
bid to impose their domination over the land. Even the 
companies of “Miquelets” (irregular militiamen) partici-
pated in this scorched-earth policy. According to Torras i 
Ribé, the last gasp of Bourbon occupation was experi-
enced with some apathy by people who were tired of so 
many years of war. Still, on a local scale, even the Bourbon 
chroniclers acknowledged the acts of revenge committed 
by the “Botiflers” (Bourbon supporters) once the war was 
over.
The last report in the congress, entitled “El Decret de 
Nova Planta i l’evolució posterior del dret català” (The 
Nueva Planta Decree and the Subsequent Evolution of 
Catalan Law), was delivered by Tomàs de Montagut, a 
professor of the History of Law at Universitat Pompeu 
Fabra and a member of the History-Archaeology Depart-
ment of the Institut d’Estudis Catalans. In early 18th-cen-
tury in Europe, there were basically two conceptions of 
sovereignty and law. The first was a conception governed 
by the rule of law and political pactism – mos itallicus – 
which could be found in some regions, such as the Princi-
pality of Catalonia. The other was a conception with 
French roots – mos gallicus – which emerged around the 
works of François Hotman and Jean Bodin, who situated 
the monarch at the core of sovereignty and the produc-
tion of law. The Nueva Planta Decree, dated the 16th of 
January 1716, emerged precisely from this latter legal tra-
dition, paired with the Spanish tradition, which was also 
markedly absolutist in nature. Therefore, the Principality 
suddenly changed from the postulates of mos itallicus to 
001-200 Catala Historical Review 8.indd   86 30/09/2015   9:06:41
Catalonia (and the Catalan-speaking lands) before and after the Eleventh of September 1714 Cat. Hist. Rev. 8, 2015   87
those of mos gallicus. However, despite the fact that the 
change was sudden, Tomàs de Montagut also explained 
that before the Nueva Planta Decree was announced, 
there was an intense debate within the Council of Castile 
about the changes that were needed in the governance of 
Catalonia and its institutions, a process that generated 
numerous consultations with and reports by figures like 
Francesc Ametller and José Patiño.
The scholar charged with delivering the closing lecture 
was Oriol Junqueras, a PhD in the History of Economic 
Thinking and Professor at the Universitat Autònoma de 
Barcelona. Entitled “L’Onze de Setembre entre la història 
i la memòria” (The Eleventh of September between His-
tory and Memory), the lecture had two parts. In the first, 
Junqueras recalled all the reasons why the Catalans chose 
to side with Archduke Charles in 1705 – economic rea-
sons, such as the Principality’s relations with the northern 
European powers; political reasons, like the similarities 
between the Catalan constitutionalist system and that of 
its allied powers; and simply the repression against the 
ruling class exercised by Castile in the previous years– 
and the reasons why the Junta General de Braços decided 
to resist to the death in 1713. The speaker then reflected 
on the memory of the Eleventh of September 1714 and 
how it has managed to survive until today. He distin-
guished between two key moments in the process: the 
first phase, when the authorities tried to erase the memo-
ry from the minds of people; and the second phase when 
people lost their fear of speaking publicly about this epi-
sode. In short, the memory of the Eleventh of September 
managed to live on thanks to society, which has preserved 
it until today.
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